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Structure, scale and emergence 
Robin Findlay Hendry 
Department of Philosophy, Durham University, 50 Old Elvet Durham, DH1 3HN, UK   







A B S T R A C T   
In this paper I consider the structures that chemists and physicists attribute at the molecular scale to substances 
and materials of various kinds, and how they relate to structures and processes at other scales. I argue that the 
structure of a substance is the set of properties and relations which are preserved across all the conditions in 
which it can be said to exist. In short, structure is abstraction. On the basis of this view, and using concrete 
examples, I argue that structures, and therefore the chemical substances and other materials to which they are 
essential, are emergent. Firstly, structures themselves are scale-dependent because they can only exist within 
certain physical conditions, and a single substance may have different structures at different scales (of length, 
time and energy). Secondly, the distinctness of both substances and structures is a scale-dependent relationship: 
above a certain point, two distinct possibilities may become one. Thirdly, the necessary conditions for compo-
sition, for both substances and molecular species, are scale-dependent. To know whether a group of nuclei and 
electrons form a molecule it is not enough to consider energy alone: one also has to know about their envi-
ronment and the lifetime over which the group robustly hangs together.   
1. How not to think about composition and structure 
Philosophers are apt to fall into three kinds of trap when thinking 
about structure and composition, and how the reality we find at different 
scales all fits together. One is to assume that it is helpful to think about 
the molecular world in precisely the same terms as macroscopic inani-
mate objects. A second is to assume that the macroscopic world is so 
unlike the everyday world that nothing of any metaphysical substance 
can be said about molecular reality. All bets are off ‘down there’. A third 
is to embrace the strangeness, even revelling in it and ignoring the 
genuine knowledge that science gives us of what goes on at larger 
scales.1 
Philosophers fall into the first kind of trap when they hear talk of 
‘microstructures’—physical relationships between nuclei and electrons 
at the molecular scale—and assume that these microstructures resemble 
the things called ‘arrangements’ into which they are able to place 
macroscopic inanimate objects. This is misleading in a number of ways. 
Firstly, ‘arrangement’ suggests something static, whereas nuclei and 
electrons are constantly in motion. In fact if quantum mechanics is 
correct it is (at least nomologically) impossible for them to be entirely at 
rest. This has important consequences for what we should understand by 
the word ‘structure’. Secondly, taking ‘arrangements’ of macroscopic 
inanimate objects as the model for thinking about how atoms or sub-
atomic particles form larger structures assumes that they aggregate and 
form (or fail to form) composite objects in just the same ways as bricks or 
billiard balls. This is surely false, because there are principled (nomic or 
metaphysical) reasons why, for instance, we cannot recover an atom 
from a molecule in the way that we can (in principle) recover a partic-
ular brick from a demolished house. Thirdly, ‘arrangement’ invokes a 
purely spatial relationship between parts, but this entirely neglects two 
physical quantities that are central to understanding structure and 
composition in the material sciences: energy and time. Lastly, 
‘arrangement’ suggests frailty and fragility (or at least allows it), while 
the structure of a molecule is robust: there are internal forces holding it 
E-mail address: r.f.hendry@durham.ac.uk.   
1 In their manifesto for a naturalist metaphysics, James Ladyman, Don Ross, David Spurrett and John Collier (2007) identify and avoid the first and second of these 
traps. I am less sure about the third one. Although I am sympathetic to the idea that there is an asymmetrical relationship between physics and special sciences, their 
‘Principle of Naturalistic Closure’ (2007, 37) and ‘Primacy of Physics Constraint’ (2007, 38) give too much privilege to what they call ‘fundamental’ physics, and in 
quite the wrong way. I fear that these two principles lead them to take too seriously some non-representative mathematical features of physical theories whose 
acceptance is temporary. 
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together, which means that it can survive some motion among its parts, 
and some distortion by external forces. Such an object is more than just 
an arrangement.2 
Other philosophers avoid the first trap, realising that the everyday 
world might not always be a good guide to understanding the molecular 
world, and acknowledging (even embracing) its Heraclitean strange-
ness. But they fall into another trap when they become too impressed by 
this. Arthur Eddington must take some of the blame, when he distin-
guished between the commonsense and scientific conceptions of the 
table on which he was writing (1928, xi-x). The former is solid and 
substantial, while the latter is insubstantial, consisting mostly of empty 
space. According to science ‘the paper before me is poised as it were on a 
swarm of flies and sustained in shuttlecock fashion by a series of tiny 
blows from the swarm underneath’ (1928, x). Eddington thought there 
was strong scientific evidence for the emptiness he invoked: Ernest 
Rutherford had argued that the behaviour of α-particles fired through 
thin gold foil showed that most of the mass and charge was concentrated 
in a volume which is very small compared with the size of the gold atoms 
(Eddington, 1928, pp. 1–2). What had appeared to be a solid material 
now turned out to be just so much empty space! Eddington can be 
forgiven his error on the grounds that he was writing early in the 
development of quantum theory, before its insights had properly been 
integrated into the physics of materials. Unfortunately his discussion of 
the two tables has encouraged many philosophers to paint the same 
verbal pictures, often buzzing with insect metaphors. W.V. Quine asked 
of the molecular theory: ‘Does it repudiate our familiar solids and 
declare for swarms of molecules, or does it keep the solids and explain 
them as subvisibly swarming with molecules?’ (1960, 265). In con-
trasting the manifest and the scientific image, Wilfrid Sellars also cited 
Eddington, claiming that theoretical physics (1991, 35–6) viewed ‘man’ 
as a ‘swirl of physical particles, forces, and fields’ (1991, 20). More 
recently, David Lewis assumed that ‘all things are swarms of particles’ 
(1999, 164), while according to Achille Varzi ‘material objects are just 
swarms of subatomic particles frantically dancing in an otherwise empty 
space’ (2011, 136). 
These are deeply misleading pictures. Matter is far from being empty 
space. An atom fills the space it occupies, and it does so by being partly 
composed of bound electrons that exclude the bound electrons of which 
other atoms are partly composed. On most interpretations of quantum 
mechanics, electrons are not like the golden snitch of quidditch, flitting 
about here and there but always being somewhere, allowing the α-par-
ticles to lumber through unimpeded (like bludgers, but without always 
causing the same havoc). For the purposes of understanding the col-
lective properties of nuclei and electrons in matter at the macroscopic 
scale, the electron is smeared out across all of the space occupied by the 
atom, unless something physical is done to localise it. Eddington’s 
inference to emptiness is also mistaken because it treats solidity as an all- 
or-nothing affair. Solidity is more like hardness, in that an object is solid 
to the degree that it can exclude other matter from the space it occupies. 
Seeing atoms as so much empty space, because one can sometimes fire 
α-particles though them, is then like saying that diamonds are soft 
because there exist harder materials that can be used to scratch them. 
No: Eddington’s discussion of his two tables is fatally flawed by its 
failure to acknowledge that hardness and solidity are scale-relative. 
Eddington’s table is solid at the macroscopic scale, and this is 
explained by the way its constituent atoms are bonded together and 
exclude other atoms. Furthermore, the talk of ‘swarms’ suggests chaos, 
obscuring the fact that there can be systematic regularities in the mo-
tions of particles at the molecular scale, like the orbit of a planet. Of 
course subatomic particles do not have paths, and so do not have orbits, 
but there are constants to their motion. It is to the constants of particular 
motions that chemistry and physics will look for structural explanation 
at the molecular scale. Given the inferences that philosophers typically 
draw using the term, one must assume that a ‘swarm’ is something very 
complex, with vague boundaries, which is (in a loose sense) composed of 
much smaller objects. To echo an earlier point, this picture neglects time 
and energy. 
Just as disastrous, in my view, is the third trap, fallen into by phi-
losophers and scientists who are so impressed by the strangeness of the 
sub-molecular world that they embrace world views which are literally 
incredible, according to which macroscopic reality as we perceive it is 
an illusion. Eddington is urged to relinquish his macroscopic table 
entirely, on the grounds that it embodies folk-intuition rather than sci-
entific knowledge. Only the most fundamental and general principles of 
physics can say anything worthwhile about physical reality, and so 
much the worse for anything which isn’t deducible from such principles 
without idealisation or approximation. Or perhaps the evidence of our 
own eyes is dismissed because we are taken to have only a limited 
perceptual perspective on reality, either because (i) we can perceive just 
three dimensions, when according to quantum mechanics we live in a 
space with many more dimensions, or (ii) we have experiential access 
only to a single universe, but in reality inhabit a continuously branching 
multiverse, whose existence can be inferred only by interpreting the 
mathematical structure of quantum mechanics in just the right way. The 
mistake here is to pay too much interpretative attention to the axioms of 
the general theory, while ignoring its applications. If a physical theory 
such as quantum mechanics gives us knowledge of the world, then surely 
the most secure knowledge it gives us is embodied in its explanatory 
applications. Philosophers of good sense and good taste would do well to 
concentrate their attention on these applications, rather than on the 
axioms of the theory. 
Now this paper isn’t about tables, or any other ‘ordinary’ macro-
scopic objects. It’s about chemical substances and molecules. What 
follows is part of an attempt to understand one aspect of the thinking, 
workings and results of the material sciences, taking into account the 
more general perspective of the framework of theories within which, for 
well over a century, material scientists have taken themselves to be 
working. I want to explore a conception of structure and composition 
that is inspired by, and consistent with: (i) the theories, and the classi-
ficatory and explanatory practice of the sciences of matter; (ii) the fact 
that the molecular world is never at rest, so that talk of ‘arrangements’ is 
best avoided; (iii) the fact that chemists and physicists sometimes 
attribute different kinds of structure to the same thing, sometimes at 
different scales, and that there is no simple rule that one of these must 
always be prior to the others. My account of structure and composition is 
therefore in the spirit of the ‘scale-free universe’ sketched by Mariam 
Thalos, in which ‘there is all manner of activity in the universe, 
happening at every scale’ (2013, 5). It also has much in common with 
the ‘scale relativity of ontology’ urged by Ladyman et al. (2007, 
199–200).3 One scale (shorter length or timescales, higher energy) 
should not be assumed to have priority over the others. I would not deny 
that we can sometimes argue for the ontological priority of one scale 
over another, but any such priority has to be earned through specific 
arguments, grounded in science. 
2. Structures in chemistry and physics 
Structure at the molecular scale is central to understanding how 
materials behave. Chemical substances are named for their structures: 
2 For a very clear illustration of the dangers of reasoning about mereological 
composition in terms of ‘arrangements’ see Theodore Sider’s discussion (2001, 
Section 4.9). 
3 With two provisos. One I mentioned earlier; a second is that the phrase 
‘scale-relativity of ontology’ suggests Carnap’s formal mode: a meta- 
metaphysical claim that different ‘ontologies’ can be usefully applied at 
different scales. ‘Scale-relativity of existence’ would be more a more congenial 
way to convey the material-mode (and straightforwardly realist) claim about 
structure that I am trying to get at. 
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atoms, ions and the structural relationships between them provide the 
sole basis for the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry’s 
three systems of systematic nomenclature (see Leigh, Favre, & Meta-
nomski, 1998). The structure of substances provides the basis for un-
derstanding how they do what they do: reacting with other substances, 
and transforming into new ones; interacting with radiation and giving 
rise to their characteristic spectroscopic behaviour, including many of 
the colours we see around us. This raises a question: just what is a 
structure? In general, the structure of a thing is how its parts fit together 
to make up the whole. Separating the ‘parts’ and the ‘how’, a structure 
must involve some relata and some relations.4 As relata, chemical 
classification and explanation appeals to atoms, ions and (often 
implicitly) electrons. Things are a little more complicated when it comes 
to the relations. In other papers (2013, 2016b) I have argued that 
specifications of structures in chemistry and physics involve two distinct 
families of relations between atoms, ions and electrons: geometrical 
relationships and bonds. This generates two distinct but intimately 
related conceptions of structure, which I have called geometrical 
structure and bond structure (Hendry, 2013; 2016b). I will now provide 
a brief account of each, then going on to argue that they are distinct, and 
that neither kind of structure should be considered more basic than the 
other. 
To ascribe a geometrical structure to a substance or material is to 
describe stable geometrical relations between its constituent atoms, ions 
and molecules. A crystal can be described in terms of how its constituent 
atoms, ions or other groups of atoms are packed together into a three- 
dimensional lattice. Sodium chloride (NaCl) is composed of positively- 
charged sodium ions and negatively-charged chloride ions in a one-to- 
one ratio. Solid NaCl is composed of ‘two interpenetrating face-centred 
cubic sub-lattices’ (Greenwood, 1968, p. 48), in each of which a so-
dium (or chloride) ion is surrounded by six chloride (or sodium) ions 
arranged octahedrally. The crystal may therefore be considered as a 
(potentially infinite) array of unit cells, each cell containing four sodium 
ions and four chloride ions (see Fig. 1). 
Sodium chloride is a simple example of a crystal, as it is formed by 
the close-packing of ions which can be regarded as charged spheres, 
without any internal structure. Other crystalline structures are formed 
by molecules and ions which do have internal structure: we will discuss 
them later. The structure of an ionic crystal arises from the close-packing 
of its ions in a way that minimises the overall energy of the lattice given 
the charge and relative size of the ions. The force holding the NaCl 
lattice together is the Coulomb force, which is spherically symmetrical. 
Hence there are no bonds between the ions, considered as pairwise re-
lationships between the ions: no sodium ion bears any special relation-
ship to any one of its neighbouring chloride ions. 
Now a lattice does not consist of stationary atoms, molecules or ions: 
matter is always in motion, which implies a number of things. Firstly, 
the lattice structure of salt must involve geometrical relationships be-
tween loci: small regions of space explored by the ions. Secondly, the 
higher the temperature the greater the energy available to the ions to 
explore the space around them, constrained by the lattice. Above a 
certain temperature (801 ◦C in the case of NaCl), enough of the ions 
acquire enough energy to escape the forces holding them in the lattice, 
which then breaks down, forming a liquid consisting mostly of dissoci-
ated ions. Since the ions are now free to move under electrical forces, the 
molten salt is an electrical conductor, unlike the solid, which is an 
insulator. Clearly the geometrical structure of solid NaCl does not sur-
vive transition to the liquid phase. Since the constituent molecular 
species in a liquid have far more freedom to move, the structure of a 
liquid must be characterised in terms of looser spatial relationships 
between the constituent species: pair correlation functions describing 
the probability density for given molecular or atomic species in terms of 
their distance from a specified central atom (see Fig. 2). 
Distinct from the purely geometrical structure, which is constituted 
by spatial relationships between atoms or ions, a substance may have a 
bond structure (for discussion see Hendry, 2008b, 2013; 2016b): the 
bond structure of a molecule is the network of bonds connecting its 
constituent atoms and ions, and which constrains their relative motions. 
The bond structure of water (a central oxygen atom to which are 
attached two hydrogens) is not really expressed by the formula ‘H2O’, 
which explicitly conveys only the molar ratio of hydrogen and oxygen in 
the substance (since no other substance has the formula H2O, however, 
it may be used to refer to water without ambiguity). Consider also 
ethane, C2H6: a single bond links two carbon atoms whose remaining 
valences are used up by six hydrogen atoms. Alternatively, one might 
say that an ethane molecule consists of two methyl (-CH3) groups con-
nected by a single bond (hence another common formula for ethane is 
CH3CH3). A complete specification of the bond structure of a sub-
stance—called a ‘full structural formula’—shows every atom and every 
bond (see Figs. 3 and 4). 
Now a full structural formula may or may not provide geometrical 
information. In Fig. 3, for instance, the angle between the two O–H 
bonds in the H2O molecule is shown (approximately) correctly to be 
around 104◦. In Fig. 4 however, the formula for ethane misrepresents 
the angle between two neighbouring C–H bonds as being around 90◦. 
This is no mistake: the formula is intended to abstract away from any 
particular geometrical arrangement of the atoms to concentrate on the 
connectivity between the atoms. To a large extent this is sufficient to 
account for ethane’s chemical behaviour. In fact, the geometry of the 
carbon atoms is roughly tetrahedral, the H–C–H angle being around 
109◦. Further geometrical details of the ethane molecule are compli-
cated by the fact that the two methyl groups rotate quite freely around 
Fig. 1. Solid sodium chloride, after Greenwood, 1968, p. 48.  Fig. 2. Pair correlation functions (g(r)) for molten NaCl at 875 
◦C: solid line 
gNaCl; dotted line gNaNa; dashed line gClCl, from Biggin & Enderby, 1982, L306. 
4 Among philosophers, a ‘structure’ is sometimes taken to involve the re-
lations only, abstracting away from the relata. That is not always how it works 
in chemistry, where a structure very often includes the relata. 
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the single bond between the two carbon atoms. Given the bond angles 
between the hydrogens attached to each carbon atom,5 one can distin-
guish two different geometrical configurations (or conformations) that 
ethane can take: staggered ethane, in which the hydrogen atoms are 
offset, and eclipsed ethane, in which they are aligned. These two 
different conformations can be represented in Newman and sawhorse 
projections, as in Fig. 5. 
The staggered conformation is of slightly lower energy than the 
eclipsed conformation, so rotation around the C–C bond is not entirely 
free. Nevertheless ethane, as Bassindale colourfully puts it, ‘can be 
thought of in terms of two linked CH3 propellors, with each CH3 rotating 
rapidly’ (1984, 25), the eclipsed conformation now appearing as three 
small regularly occurring hindrances, passed over by the propellors like 
bumps in the road. Ethane’s bond structure, represented in Fig. 4, is an 
invariant feature through these motions. It is a complex structural 
property that is shared by all the different conformations. 
Geometrical structure and bond structure play independent roles in 
structural explanation. A simple ionic lattice such as NaCl appears to be 
constructed without appeal to bonds, at least the localised pairwise re-
lationships between atoms or ions that generate a bond structure. In the 
case of ethane, the bond structure works as a constraint on the geomet-
rical relationships between the molecule’s constituent atoms. Bond 
structure also appears as a constraint on geometrical relationships be-
tween atoms within the structures of molecular crystals.6 
3. Structure, scale and substance 
A substance may present distinct structures at different length scales. 
Seen from afar, a steel bar looks homogeneous, homogeneity being a 
null kind of structure. Closer in, there are imperfections: discontinuities 
arising from the grain structure at the millimetre scale. Within the grains 
are atomic lattices. These differences of structure across scales are re-
flected in physical explanations of steel’s behaviour at the various scales 
(see Batterman, 2013). A substance may also present distinct structures 
across different timescales. According to Bassindale ‘measurement 
techniques with relatively long timescales would show an averaged 
geometry for ethane, but very short-timescale techniques could observe 
ethane in a staggered conformation’ (1984, 51). In the case of ice, 
Eisenberg and Kauzmann (1969, 150–2) point out that H2O molecules in 
ice undergo vibrational, rotational and translational motions, the mol-
ecules vibrating much faster than they rotate or move through the lat-
tice. At very short timescales (shorter than the period of vibration), the 
structure of ice is a snapshot of molecules caught in mid-vibration. It will 
be disordered because different molecules will be caught at slightly 
different stages of the vibration. As timescales get longer, the structure 
averages over the vibrational motions, and then (at yet longer scales) the 
rotational and translational motions. This yields successively more 
regular but diffuse structures. Therefore 
the term ‘structure’ can have three different meanings when applied 
to a crystal such as ice. The meaning depends on whether one con-
siders a time interval short compared to the period for an oscillation 
(τv), or an interval longer than the period of an oscillation but less 
than the time for a displacement (τD), or an interval considerably 
longer than the displacement time. (1969, 151). 
It may be tempting to assume that the structures presented at close 
range, and at shorter timescales, are ontologically prior to those 
observed at longer range and longer timescales. One may even doubt 
that the longer-range and timescale structures are really distinct at all, if 
they are just dim impressions of what one would see at close range, or 
averages over higher-frequency snapshots. In one sense this is correct: if 
one takes a series of snapshots at a higher frequency, one could recon-
struct the average one would see at a lower frequency.7 Yet there is a 
counterfactual difference: many different series of snapshots could have 
given rise to the same average, and which particular series was seen is 
irrelevant. Put another way, the averaged picture is what one sees at the 
particular frequency that is appropriate to it. It is not an illusion. These 
arguments concern timescales. Achille Varzi considers distance, arguing 
that a boundary seen from afar must be illusory, because it disappears on 
closer approach: 
It is true that I had the impression of seeing the shoreline of Long 
Island from my plane; but it is also true that when you actually go 
there, ground-level, things look very different. What looked from the 
air like a sharp line turns out to be an intricate array of stones, sand, 
algae, piers, boardwalks, concrete blocks, musk sediments, marshy 
spots, putrid waters, decayed fish. (2011, 139) 
Moreover, if a coastline is identified with the ‘water/sand interface’ 
then ‘That boundary is constantly in flux, and it is only by filtering it 
through our cognitive apparatus—it is only by interpolating objects and 
concepts—that a clear-cut line will emerge.’ (2011, 139) I don’t think 
one should dismiss the lower-resolution views. Even if the straightness 
disappears when one gets closer, a beach that looks long and straight 
from the air may really present a long straight boundary to incoming 
water waves, producing plane waves by reflection. Moreover, concen-
trating only on the view from close up, one may literally lose the bigger 
picture. The shape of the beach, like the structure of a molecule, depends 
on the appropriate scale for the process by which one is investigating it. 
These are matters of physical interaction, not of perception or 
conception. 
A second aspect of the scale-relativity of structure is that relation-
ships of structural sameness and difference vary across different scales. 
This variation can occur at two different levels: in the way that mole-
cules interact to form macroscopic substances, and in the structural 
distinctness of the molecules themselves. At the level of the substances, 
consider Louis Pasteur’s achievement in separating, by hand, crystals of 
the L- and D-forms of sodium ammonium tartrate, obtained from a 
racemic solution (an equal mixture of the two). This is a famous exem-
plar of structural explanation in science, and its experimental demon-
stration, for the L- and D-forms are enantiomers: structures which are 
mirror images, but which cannot be superimposed on each other. It is 
less well known that had Pasteur attempted the separation at a higher 
temperature than he did, he would likely have failed, because above 
26 ◦C the L- and D-salts form a single racemate (Kauffman & Myers, 
1975).8 
For an example of the timescale-dependence of the sameness and 
difference of molecular structure, consider substituted biphenyls, which 
Fig. 3. The full structural formula of water.  
Fig. 4. The full structural formula of ethane.  
5 In line with our generally Heraclitean picture there are also regular motions 
associated with these bond angles. The three hydrogen atoms attached to each 
carbon wag and vibrate around their central geometry.  
6 See for instance the discussion by Eisenberg and Kauzmann (1969, Chapter 
3) of the structure of ice, and Cox, 1958 on benzene. The planarity of the 
benzene ring was first established crystallographically by Kathleen Lonsdale in 
the 1920s (Lonsdale, 1929). 
7 My thanks are due to Robert Schoonmaker for raising these points.  
8 My thanks are due to John Hudson for the reference. 
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contain pairs of benzene rings connected by a single bond (see Fig. 6). 
When the rings are substituted by functional groups X and Y in the 
four positions shown, the possibility of a new form of stereoisomerism 
arises—the molecule can in principle exist in two enantiomeric for-
ms—but the isomerism is interestingly temperature dependent. In gen-
eral, single carbon-carbon bonds, like the one connecting the two 
benzene rings, allow free rotation of the groups they connect. If the 
groups X and Y are relatively small (e.g. single atoms such as hydrogen 
or fluorine), then that rotation will be relatively unrestricted, though 
there will be some stearic hindrance: groups X and Y will ‘bump’ past 
each other, like the hydrogens in ethane. In such cases the two enan-
tiomers will not be separable at room temperature because they inter-
convert. There are not two enantiomers, just two enantiomeric 
conformations of a single structure. For larger X and Y, perhaps the 
enantiomers can be separated, but they racemize rapidly. For really 
bulky groups such as –NO2, or –COOH, the interaction between them 
will constitute a barrier to the rotation, the two enantiomers will be 
separable and will racemize only slowly. So for any given substituent 
groups X and Y, the physical distinctness of the enantiomers disappears 
above a characteristic temperature. Hence structural sameness and dif-
ference is a temperature- (and therefore energy-) dependent phenome-
non. It also depends on timescale. As Bassindale puts it ‘any molecules, of 
the same molecular constitution, that are rapidly interconverting, at the 
temperature of measurement are molecules of the same compound’ (1984, 
51). 
In Section 2, we saw that chemists appeal to two distinct and 
mutually irreducible kinds of structure: geometrical structure and bond 
structure. We have just seen that a single substance may have distinct 
structures at different scales of energy, time and length, and that re-
lationships of sameness and difference between structures vary across 
different scales. Doesn’t that make structure oddly perspectival, or 
interest-dependent? As long as we understand structure to be a creature 
of abstraction, there is nothing odd about it at all. A structure is the set of 
properties and relationships among a substance’s parts (at the atomic 
scale) that remains invariant over the physical conditions under which it 
exists. It is obtained by abstraction because, from the full array of 
properties and relations which are present at any particular time, we 
must subtract those properties and relations that may be present under 
some conditions and not others. Imagine some chemical substance S 
within some range of physical conditions C. Let R be the relationships 
among its parts which survive across C. Over a wider range of physical 
conditions, some subset of R will be maintained. The strongest structure 
we can specify for a substance is the set of relationships among its parts 
that survive across the full range of conditions under which it exists. 
More can be said about shared structure over narrower ranges of con-
ditions, but we need to find the right level of generality or scale to find 
commonality among a diverse group of things: right from the point of 
view of understanding what the substance can do, what it can have done 
to it, and what it can survive. For the elements, which (modern chem-
istry assumes) can survive across different states of chemical combina-
tion, and even in plasmas, the underlying structures are the nuclei, and 
in particular their charges. For a compound substance such as water, the 
abstraction is taken across its different states of aggregation, but all of 
them are produced by interactions among H2O molecules. The physical 
conditions in which water can survive must then be a proper subset of 
those in which its elemental components can survive: water is dependent 
on them, and the structures which underwrite their existence. 
Abstraction is taken to be a form of partial consideration, or selective 
attention to properties and relation instances existing within a substance 
across the conditions within which it exists (see Heil, 2003, p. 172). 
Neither the reality nor the metaphysical seriousness of structure is 
undermined by this view, for we are selectively attending to such 
genuine physical properties and relations as charge, mass and spatial 
proximity. Even chemical bonds can be regarded as topological features 
of a molecule’s electron density distribution (Bader, 1990). (An impli-
cation of this is that a chemical bond is a mode: a way for a portion of 
charge density to be.) These are all genuine properties and relations, 
rather than mere (monadic or polyadic) predicates, because they are 
causally efficacious: charges and masses interact via well-known phys-
ical laws in ways that depend on spatial proximity, and crystallogra-
phers investigate structure by bouncing X-rays off electron density 
distributions within crystals. It is the selection which is 
interest-dependent, and can be done in different ways, but we are 
selecting only among the real. 
One consequence of this view is that if chemical classification is 
based on structure, and there is more than one way to abstract away 
from the structure of a given substance, the a priori requirement that 
natural schemes of classification should be hierarchical must be 
wrongheaded.9 One would in general expect just the opposite. Consider 
NaCl, which shares structural features with diverse groups of substances. 
Abstracting away from its chlorine content it contains sodium (i.e. nuclei 
with a charge of 9), which it has in common with (for instance) sodium 
bromide. Abstracting away from its sodium content it contains chlorine 
(i.e. nuclei with a charge of 17), which it has in common with potassium 
chloride and carbon tetrachloride. The sodium-containing substances 
and the chlorine-containing substances overlap (in sodium chloride), 
but neither includes the other. Abstracting away from its elemental 
components entirely, solid sodium chloride is a face-centred cubic 
crystal, a structure it shares with most of the alkali-metal halides, the 
alkaline-earth metal oxides and many other ionic substances. Sodium 
chloride and face-centred cubic crystals overlap, but neither includes the 
other, for sodium chloride need not be a face-centred cubic crystal 
(molten sodium chloride is still sodium chloride). In so far as structure 
underwrites chemical classification, and structure is abstraction, the 
hierarchy condition must fail (Hendry, 2016a). 
There are good reasons to go further than classificatory 
Fig. 5. Newman and sawhorse projections of staggered ethane and eclipsed ethane, from Bassindale, 1984, p. 50.  
Fig. 6. Biphenyl atropisomers, from Bassindale, 1984, p. 58.  
9 According to the hierarchy requirement, no two natural kinds may overlap 
unless one is contained within the other. For presentation and defence see Ellis, 
2001; for criticism see Khalidi, 1998, Tobin, 2010 and Hendry, 2016a. By a 
‘natural scheme of classification’ I mean one whose genera and species are 
natural kinds. 
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microstructuralism. Not only does chemistry individuate substances by 
their structure: perhaps the nature (or essence) of a substance is simply 
its structure. This is not the place to pursue a detailed argument for 
microstructural essentialism, but here is a sketch of how I think the 
argument should go. Nancy Cartwright has defended the idea that we 
can know the (Aristotelian) natures of things through what she calls ‘the 
analytic method in physics’: 
[T]o understand what happens in the world, we take things apart 
into their fundamental pieces; to control a situation we reassemble 
the pieces, we reorder them so they will work together to make 
things happen as we will. You carry the pieces from place to place, 
assembling them together in new ways and new contexts. But you 
always assume that they will try to behave in new arrangements10 as 
they have tried to behave in others. They will, in each case, act in 
accordance with their nature. (1992, 49) 
Chemical structures are very concrete examples of this. If we wish to 
employ the powers and susceptibilities of some chemical substance, we 
must assemble it in the right way from its microstructural parts, or bring 
it ready made. What is it that carries the powers and susceptibilities of a 
substance from place to place, or comes into being if we have to 
assemble it in situ? Its structure.11 
4. Scale and composition 
Chemistry concerns itself with at least three kinds of compositional 
relationship, different in respect of the characteristic scale of the relata. 
First there are compositional relationships between substances at the 
macroscopic scale, which have always been central to chemical thought. 
Lavoisier is credited with establishing that water is a compound of 
hydrogen and oxygen, and his scientific legacy can be described as a 
compositional scheme at the base of which are substances, many of 
which are still recognised as elements by modern chemistry.12 Second 
there are compositional relationships between substances and molecular 
species. These are troubled waters, upon which many confused and 
confusing discussions of chemical composition and identity have been 
launched, based on misreadings of the true compositional claim ‘water is 
H2O’. Third there are compositional relationships between entities at 
the molecular scale, including nuclei, electrons, atoms and molecules. In 
what follows I will discuss the first and third kinds of composition in 
turn. I will not address the second kind of compositional relationship 
here, except in some brief remarks in the next paragraph (but see 
Hendry, 2006; 2008a, 2017). 
Attempting to discuss ‘composition’ in chemistry may sound 
wrongheaded. Perhaps the word ‘composition’ means different things in 
chemistry and metaphysics, yielding a pun at best and confusion at 
worst. I do not think so. Chemistry really is concerned with composition 
as metaphysicians understand it. I hope my discussion will make that 
clear. If I am right, ‘composition’ is unlike ‘substance’, which means 
something quite different in metaphysics and in chemistry, though the 
meanings are clearly related. Chemical substances are kinds of stuff 
viewed from the perspective of chemistry, a discipline that individuates 
them by their structure at the molecular scale (or so I argue: see Hendry, 
2006). In metaphysics, substances are sometimes taken to be things that 
do not depend on anything else for their existence or identity, while at 
other times they are taken to be continuants that can be distinguished 
from both the properties they bear and the events in which they 
participate. So long as one can be neutral on the relative priority of 
continuants and occurrents, I believe that chemical substances meet the 
latter condition. I do not think they meet the former condition, at least as 
chemistry conceives of them.13 I have argued, in this paper and else-
where (2006, 2008a, 2016a, 2016b), that a chemical substance is the 
particular substance it is in virtue of certain properties of, and relations 
between, its constituents at the molecular scale. It follows that it cannot 
exist without those constituents, and the relevant properties and re-
lations. So chemical substances have a strong kind of existential 
dependence on their constituents at the molecular scale (namely elec-
trons and nuclei), on their properties, and on relations between them. If 
substances cannot be dependent on anything else then chemical sub-
stances are not substances. So what are they? They must be ways for 
collections of nuclei and electrons to be: chemical substances are 
modes.14 
Let us turn to the first kind of compositional relationship, that be-
tween chemical substances. Perhaps the oldest foundational question in 
chemistry, Aristotle’s problem of mixture, is how to identify the cir-
cumstances in which interaction between two substances, when they are 
mixed, should be considered as forming a new substance, a chemical 
combination of the two rather than a mere mixture (see Needham, 2006, 
2009).15 Aristotle argued against survival of the elements in their 
compounds: the atomist assumption that elements survive precludes a 
coherent account of chemical combination, he thought, so elements 
must be ‘used up’ when they combine. Let us instead follow modern 
chemistry (and the atomists) and presume the survival of elements in 
mixtures and compounds. Let us also allow quantities of stuff (some 
sulphur, or some iron) to count as objects. Under those assumptions, the 
problem of mixture can be regarded as a specific instance of the Special 
Composition Question (hereafter SCQ; see van Inwagen 1990): when can 
it be said, of some group of objects, that it forms a further object? The 
problem of mixture may not obviously be an instance of the SCQ, but 
consider the following. A mixture of iron filings and powdered sulphur, 
and the black crystalline compound ferrous sulphide (iron (II) sulphide, 
FeS) are easily distinguished: the former is visibly heterogeneous, the 
latter homogeneous to the eye. Aristotle took homogeneity to be the 
criterion for when real chemical combination has occurred. Homoge-
neity excluded the survival of the elements in his view, hence his 
conclusion that the elements must be ‘used up’ when genuine combi-
nation occurs, but homogeneity in what respects? Homogeneity to the 
eye is clearly insufficient. Following Aristotle, we may require that as a 
true compound, every part of iron (II) sulphide is iron (II) sulphide, but 10 In light of the earlier discussion of misuses of the term ‘arrangements,’ it is 
worth pointing out that it is being used here to mean mode of assembly, and does 
not depend on any misleading connotations.  
11 It might seem odd for me to say that THE structure of a substance is 
essential to it, given that I have just been arguing that substances have different 
structures at different scales. Which one is the essence? I argued above that 
structure is abstraction: THE structure of a substance is the set of properties and 
relations it has whenever it can be said to exist. This allows that a substance 
might display different structures at different scales, but THE structure is 
whatever these different structures all have in common. I am most grateful to an 
anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
12 Lavoisier is not so often ‘credited’ with thinking that steam, which we re-
gard as a state of water rather than a distinct substance, has a third component: 
caloric (for discussion see Hendry, 2005; 2010a). There is no role for caloric in 
modern chemistry and physics, so the temptation is to airbrush it from Lav-
oisier’s curriculum vitae. This temptation ought clearly to be resisted if one 
wishes to understand chemistry in relationship to its past. 
13 It is possible (both logically and metaphysically) that chemistry could have 
come to conceive of substances in some quite different way. But the way that 
chemistry in fact does individuate substances reflects something important 
about the world. This, I would argue, is one good reason to endorse micro-
structural essentialism.  
14 In a thought-provoking paper, Joseph Earley (2006) has also used this 
distinction between chemical substances and ‘substances’ in the metaphysical 
sense. My use of the term ‘mode’ here is not meant to invoke any particular 
categorial framework in ontology, but only to suggest ontological dependence.  
15 It would be better to use the term ‘mixt’, following Paul Needham (2006, 
2009), to indicate that some historical authors, including Aristotle, do not 
distinguish between (what are now regarded as) compounds and homogeneous 
mixtures such as solutions. From the modern point of view ‘mixt’ is a 
disjunctive term. 
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if, contra Aristotle, the elements persist in the compound (and are jointly 
exhaustive of it) then presumably there must also be some heterogene-
ity, because the ferrous sulphide is partly iron and partly sulphur.16 In 
any case, homogeneity is not sufficient for being a compound in modern 
chemistry, since solutions may be regarded as homogeneous mixtures. 
So the phrase ‘homogeneous mixture’ is not an oxymoron. 
Why should we say, with the atomists and against Aristotle, that iron 
and sulphur live on in iron sulphide? The yellow of the sulphur and grey 
of the iron have after all disappeared, replaced by uniformly black stuff. 
For modern chemistry, the sulphur and the iron live on because the 
nuclei, and more specifically their nuclear charges, survive the process 
of combination. The extension of the terms ‘sulphur’ and ‘iron’ must 
here be understood as reaching beyond the free elements (e.g. rhombic 
sulphur and metallic iron) to include all their states of chemical com-
bination. However, there are complications, which mean we cannot 
simply adopt the classical atomist picture of chemical combination, 
which Aristotle rejected (see Needham & Hendry, 2018). We have 
established that Aristotle’s problem of mixture can, under certain as-
sumptions, be regarded as a case of the SCQ. We have established that 
modern chemistry supports those assumptions. Does modern chemistry 
therefore provide an answer to the SCQ? I do not think it does, for the 
simple reason that it provides no sharp distinction between compounds 
and mixtures. There are clear cases of compounds, there are clear cases 
of mixtures, and there are penumbral cases, such as solutions. Notice, 
however, that to give an account of the distinction between substances 
and mixtures is to give a general account of the sameness and difference 
of substances, for a mixture is a body of stuff in which there is more than 
one substance. But if one individuates substances by their structures at 
the molecular scale, then one should expect the sameness and difference 
of substances to be a vague and multidimensional affair, because the 
sameness and difference of structures at the molecular scale is a vague 
and multidimensional affair. 
So we should expect the answer to the SCQ for chemical substances 
to be vague and multi-dimensional. We should also expect it to involve 
energy, because that is how chemistry and physics answer questions 
about stability. A necessary condition for chemical combination to occur 
is that the composite is more stable than the components separately, i.e. 
the Gibbs free energy associated with the change should be negative. But 
thermodynamics tells us that some changes are ‘spontaneous’, in that 
the associated change in the Gibbs free energy is negative, but they 
nevertheless happen only very slowly.17 In short, there is a distinction 
between thermodynamic and kinetic stability: this means that it is 
physically possible that some thermodynamically unstable but kineti-
cally stable things continue to exist, in the sense that they are in the 
process of spontaneously transforming into something else, but are 
doing so only very slowly. Meanwhile we have to include their powers 
and susceptibilities in a general account of why things happen. Energetic 
stability on its own is not enough to understand the physical existence of 
a composite: lifetime and environment, or rather lifetime in an envi-
ronment, must also be taken into account. In very general terms, how 
slowly must something be spontaneously be converting into something 
else in order to be said to exist? Presumably, slowly enough to be 
detected, and therefore slowly enough to be able to display at least some 
of its characteristic powers and susceptibilities. 
Also closely related to the SCQ is a question that chemistry has been 
able to formulate precisely ever since it began closely to engage with 
physics, in the form of quantum mechanics, during the 1920s: when does 
a group of atoms form a molecule?18 This is the third kind of composi-
tional relationship. The question is very neatly, but I will argue incom-
pletely, answered by comparing and contrasting the electronic energies 
of the dimers of hydrogen (H2) and helium (He2). H2 is said to be stable 
because there is a net energy decrease on formation of the molecule, 
while for He2 there is no such decrease. The molecule is not energetically 
favoured over the separated atoms, which simply drift apart. For this 
reason He2 is sometimes said not to exist, but that is an incomplete ac-
count of the situation: the environment and the lifetime of the species 
must be taken into account. Helium atoms interact weakly via van der 
Waals forces: random variations in the electronic charge distribution 
give rise to a dipole on one atom, which induces dipoles in its neigh-
bours. The resulting attractive forces are very weak, but at very low 
temperatures a significant proportion of helium exists as dimers, 
significantly altering the behaviour of liquid helium near absolute zero. 
Now the very same interactions take place at higher temperatures, it is 
just that they are far too weak to constrain the motions of atoms. One 
might say that helium dimers come into fleeting existence only for 
thermal energy (in the form of vibrations) to rip them apart, but that 
fails to distinguish the low-temperature and the room-temperature sit-
uations. At room temperature the translational kinetic energy of the 
helium atoms overwhelms the van der Waals attraction. When two he-
lium atoms collide nothing holds them together. The dimer doesn’t 
vibrate because the ‘restoring force’ is too weak to bring the two atoms 
back from the recoil even once. The shallow local van der Waals mini-
mum in the potential energy surface is merely a bump on the road passed 
over during the collision. It does not constrain the motion of the indi-
vidual helium atoms. The two atoms neither move as a composite object 
nor form a system with any composite motions. That’s why there is no 
virtue in seeing them as a dimer. At low temperatures the powers and 
susceptibilities of He2 must be taken into account when describing the 
behaviour of helium, but this is not the case at higher temperatures. At 
room temperature there is no He2, which is why its powers and sus-
ceptibilities need not be taken into account in understanding the 
behaviour of room-temperature helium. 
An interesting penumbral case is provided by reactive intermediates: 
do they have a distinct existence, or are they just transition stages be-
tween genuine existents? When chemical reactions occur, the reactants 
very often have to pass through a higher-energy transition state before 
the reaction can proceed. This provides an energetic barrier to the re-
action the height of which (the activation energy) partly determines how 
fast the reaction occurs (hence this is also the basis of the distinction 
between thermodynamic and kinetic stability). But at the top of this 
energetic ‘hill’ there may be a little hollow, or dip. Depending on the 
depth of this dip, and the energetic environment, a particular group of 
atoms may occupy it for some considerable time. In some cases, the 
intermediate may even be isolable (see Fig. 7). 
From an energetic point of view alone, the difference between the 
two cases is a matter of degree, even though important distinctions hang 
on it: 
For a reaction proceeding through the intermediate, there is a ‘dip’ or 
minimum in the energy profile diagram. The deeper the dip, the 16 This we know anyway, if matter is discontinuous, as modern chemistry and 
physics presume.  
17 One of these is the conversion of diamond into graphite. 
18 Strictly speaking, it is a version of the SCQ only on the assumption that 
atoms continue to exist in a molecule. This may seem a substantial assumption, 
but the Atoms in Molecules (AIM) programme provides a quantum- 
mechanically non-arbitrary way to ‘carve up’ a molecule exhaustively into 
neutral atoms (Bader, 1990; Popelier, 2000, Chapter 3). Atoms in molecules are 
not spherical, but free atoms are not always spherical, and it is highly 
implausible in any case that sphericity should be an essential property of an 
atom. 
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more stable the intermediate and the more sure we may be of its 
existence. ... In the extreme case the dip becomes so slight that the 
intermediate a is experimentally indistinguishable from a transition 
state. If the intermediate is isolable, we are in effect considering two 
reactions, each with its own transition state. In such cases, a sub-
stance becomes designated as an intermediate simply because the 
‘reaction’ originally chosen is a composite one. (Gould, 1959, 130)19 
Crucially, even if the dip is not deep enough for the intermediate to 
be isolated it might be detected directly, because it exists long enough to 
go through a few cycles of some characteristic vibration, and so in 
principle be detectable by spectroscopic means. Despite being too un-
stable for separation, it demonstrates its own existence by exercising its 
powers.20 Conversely, if the dip is too shallow the intermediate cannot 
make its existence known in this way. Once again, this suggests that we 
cannot understand molecular existence in terms of energy alone. We also 
need to know about timescales. 
For these reasons I must regard as incomplete the ‘bound-state pro-
posal’ recently advanced as a response to the SCQ by Kerry McKenzie 
and F.A. Muller: 
[Physical] objects form a composite object iff these physical objects 
interact and are in a common bound state, where ‘common bound state’ 
means that the composing objects are in the potential well that re-
sults of their mutual physical interaction. (2017, 234) 
This proposal seems to have a number of virtues.21 Firstly, although 
the condition applies widely, it is technically a ‘moderate’ one in van 
Inwagen’s terms because it entails neither mereological universalism 
nor mereological nihilism. Secondly, it aligns composition with physical 
explanation. As we have seen, chemists and physicists typically explain 
the existence of various objects in terms of relationships between energy 
and structure. A group of objects being in such a common bound state is 
(at least sometimes) the explanation of why they do not ‘fly apart’ (2017, 
235). 
However, the reference to a ‘potential well’ is less clear than it 
sounds. Does it mean the global minimum on a potential energy surface 
for the relevant parts, or a local one? If a global minimum is required the 
bound-state proposal doesn’t deal well with composite objects whose 
existence over time results from their being metastable (see above): 
physical systems that are unstable with respect to close-lying structures, 
but which persist for relatively long periods owing to the slow rate of 
conversion. These include glasses, which might be regarded as very 
slowly relaxing into crystalline states, but also diamonds (because 
graphite is a lower-energy configuration of carbon atoms), and chemical 
elements other than iron (because iron represents the global minimum 
on a graph of binding energy per nucleon). Philosophers often like to 
embrace the counterintuitive consequences of their theories, but surely 
the cost here is too high. Hence ‘minimum’ should be interpreted as 
‘local minimum,’ in which case ‘potential well’ means (a small region 
around) a turning point at which the curvature of the graph of energy as 
a function of geometrical configuration is positive. There are many more 
such points than one might imagine: take the rotation of the CH3-group 
‘propellors’ around the carbon-carbon bond in ethane, discussed earlier. 
Interference between the hydrogen atoms presents a barrier to rotation, 
so the ‘eclipsed’ conformation is of slightly higher energy than the 
‘staggered’ conformation. In rotating, the ethane molecule therefore 
traverses a sinusoidal potential energy curve, inhabiting the troughs for 
a ‘finite, but very short residence time’ (Bassindale, 1984, p. 51). Does a 
series of staggered ethane molecules pass into and out of existence 
millions of times a second? Under my earlier proposal, according to 
which structure is a creature of abstraction, this is less troubling than it 
sounds because the ethane molecule itself survives these changes. The 
situation with helium molecules is worse: the two atoms instantaneously 
experience an attraction (such a romantic tale), momentarily occupying 
a common potential well before flying apart on the rebound. The 
bound-state proposal as formulated forces us to bite the bullet and say 
that two helium atoms colliding form a fleeting molecule. Defending the 
bound-state proposal, one might say that we tend to ignore fleeting 
existences because they don’t make themselves felt, but this is like the 
mereological universalist, who is forced to invoke pragmatic consider-
ations to explain why the Eiffel Tower and my left big toe do not form a 
composite object whose existence is as kosher as that of a hydrogen 
molecule. I think it is better to amend the metaphysics than to invoke 
such wide-ranging pragmatic corrections. The problem is really (as we 
saw earlier) that the low-temperature and room-temperature situations 
need to be treated differently. 
In that spirit I suggest two friendly amendments to McKenzie and 
Muller’s proposal. Firstly, to avoid the unwanted room-temperature 
helium molecules, one might say that a composite object exists when 
its parts are trapped in a potential well, in that they are in the potential 
well and have insufficient kinetic energy to escape. There are modal and 
temporal aspects to the difference between helium at low temperature 
and at room temperature. At low temperature the interaction between 
the atoms is strong enough to pull the atoms back from their thermal 
vibrations, and the dimer lives long enough to display its characteristic 
powers and susceptibilities, which include vibrating at specific fre-
quencies. Neither of these things is true at room temperature. The modal 
aspect is suggested by the name McKenzie and Muller chose for their 
proposal, but gets lost in their articulation of it. My second suggested 
amendment is to restrict the scope of their proposal because I am less 
confident than McKenzie and Muller that it accounts for the existence of 
animals: ‘if the particles of a cat, say, were not in a bound state they 
would fly apart in all directions’ (2017, 235). It is not so obvious that the 
particles in a cat (a far-from-equilibrium system) are not flying apart, 
since it is continuously shedding matter in various directions. Yet the cat 
exists nonetheless (as a process), suggesting that we should look else-
where for a physical explanation of its existence. The best one can hope 
for McKenzie and Muller’s proposal, even an amended version of it, is as 
a disjunct in what van Inwagen (1990, 64–71) calls ‘series-style’ re-
sponses to the SCQ. It is not at all surprising to me that cats and mole-
cules should bear quite different relationships to their material parts. 
5. Conclusion: structure, scale and emergence 
I began this paper with an extended complaint about how, when they 
discuss structure and composition, philosophers often misuse the word 
‘arrangement’. The main mistake they make is to assume that composed 
things are really nothing but arrangements of their parts. If an 
‘arrangement’ is just a static array then it is indeed hard to see how the 
parts arranged this way are really any different from the same parts 
Fig. 7. Energy profiles for reactions proceeding through intermediates, from 
Gould, 1959, p. 130. 
19 Note that although Gould puts the word ‘reaction’ in inverted commas, 
there is no logical difficulty in a chemical reaction being composite in the sense 
he discusses. Many well-known chemical reactions are composite in this way.  
20 This is why it is sometimes possible to create and detect a nucleus of a 
superheavy element whose existence is too fleeting for it to count as a true 
chemical element: it can be detected spectroscopically but cannot (physically) 
live long enough to capture electrons and have them relax into a stable elec-
tronic configuration. See Hendry, 2020.  
21 I am not sure that their proposal is meant entirely seriously (see McKenzie & 
Muller, 2017, 241), so I hope they will forgive my po-faced response. 
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arranged some other way. This is why, I think, compositional nihilism is 
so bafflingly popular among those who try to address the SCQ. Being 
arranged in some particular way cannot, surely, add anything to the 
situation. But that is a poor model for composition in the physical sci-
ences. Nothing like ‘arrangements’ of this kind appear in the explana-
tions offered by sciences that study chemical substances and their 
structures at the molecular scale. Nuclei and electrons are always in 
motion. Experiments reveal different structures at different scales of 
energy, time and length. This is perhaps less surprising than it might 
seem if we consider how structure and energy are related: structure is 
what gets ‘frozen in’ when matter no longer has enough energy to escape 
from the attractive forces that tend to confine it. Whole new realms of 
possibility come into being when we turn down the energy dial far 
enough for nuclei to capture electrons in the structured entities we call 
atoms and molecules. From this condensation emerges a great diversity 
of structures which chemistry, crystallography and condensed matter 
physics characterise using two kinds of interatomic relationship: ge-
ometry and the chemical bond. One might conclude that substances, and 
the structures that characterise them, are emergent. Clearly, substances 
are dependent on their structures at the molecular scale, which are in 
turn dependent on the entities, properties and relations of which they 
are formed (see Hendry, 2017, 2019). Yet we have seen that a physical 
system may present different structures at different scales. Since there is 
no general reason to think that the structures we find at lower energy 
scales, or at longer time or length scales, are reducible to those we find at 
higher energies etc., one might say that structure emerges from the 
motions of physical systems, and that different structures emerge at 
different scales. I think that this is an interesting and significant insight, 
with two aspects. One is anodyne: new things come into being under 
different conditions. The other is less anodyne: existence is tied to life-
time, and what exists at one scale, and is thereby detectable by one 
experimental method, need not exist at another scale, and so may be 
invisible to experimental methods at that other scale. This might seem 
perspectival, but as already noted these are matters of physical inter-
action, not of perception or conception. 
Now scientists and philosophers sometimes say that arguments like 
these are much less significant than they sound. They support such 
claims in different ways. Some turn away from emergence because they 
find it unclear. This is a pity I believe, because the various versions of 
emergentism are no less intelligible or able to confer enlightenment than 
the spectrum of reductionist ideas to which they are opposed. Scientists 
sometimes say that even though it is not possible to derive chemical 
explanations from fundamental physics something can be both emergent 
and ‘reducible in principle’, and moreover that we have good reasons to 
believe that everything is reducible in principle: a fully completed 
physics would account for everything that science can know. Steven 
Weinberg (2001, Chapter 10) quite explicitly makes a distinction of this 
sort, between reductionism as a ‘research programme’ and as a ‘world 
view’.22 The important thing to see is that when Weinberg says that ‘in 
principle’ fundamental physics explains everything, even if not in 
practice, he must mean something like the following: there is an un-
known future physical theory that, when applied to the whole world, 
produces an equation that nobody could write down. This equation 
‘explains’ every contingent fact (or a large proportion of them) that can 
broadly be expressed in the language of physics, despite the fact that 
there is no reason at all to think that this equation could be solved by any 
finite intelligence even if it were to be given very large (though still 
finite) computing resources. This, I would suggest, is a Pickwickian 
sense of ‘explains’. Philosophers sometimes say that the emergence I 
have argued for can only be of a so-called ‘weak’ sort. ‘Strong’ emer-
gence would require the emergents to have causal efficacy over and 
above the things on which they depend, but exclusion arguments 
exclude that possibility. Against these scientists and philosophers I say 
the following. Claims of ‘reducibility in principle’ require scientific 
support: a systematic grounding in the actual performance of real sci-
entific theories. Exclusion arguments depend on strong assumptions 
about the causal (or dynamical) completeness of physics.23 Given the 
scientific evidence, there is no reason why the completeness of physics 
should be regarded as a constraint on naturalistic discussions of the 
ontology of the physical world. In the meantime I feel free to proceed 
without this constraint, just as the atheist should feel free to address 
questions about what there is, where it has come from and how one 
should live, free of any assumption of a personal and transcendent 
creator, without being able to demonstrate the non-existence of that 
creator. 
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